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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellee ("Hillside") does not dispute Appellant's ("Pomodoro") Statement of Jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Hillside does not dispute If 1 of Pomodoro's Statement of the Issues. Hillside disputes fflf 2 
and 3 of Pomodoro's Statement of the Issues insofar as they imply that the trial court's legal analysis 
was subject to any mandatory threshold review of equitable principles. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Hillside does not dispute Pomodoro's stated Standard of Review, but would add that a 
reviewing court "determine[s] only whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law and 
whether the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact." Glover ex 
rel. Dvson v. Bov Scouts of America, 923 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Utah 1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Hillside does not dispute Pomodoro's general Statement of the Case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Hillside does not dispute % 1 of Pomodoro's Statement of Facts. 
2. Hillside does not dispute f 2 of Pomodoro's Statement of Facts. 
3. Hillside does not dispute Pomodoro's general characterization of the lease renewal 
option as contained in f 3 of Pomodoro's Statement of Facts, but avers that the lease renewal option 
document speaks for itself. 
1 
4. Hillside denies that either Brian Morton or Wendy Caron objectively, affirmatively, 
or unambiguously conveyed their express intent to Hillside or its representatives to exercise the lease 
renewal option on behalf of Pomodoro. The portions of Brian Morton's affidavit cited as support 
for the averment in f^ 4 of Pomodoro's Statement of Facts that "Mr. Morton and Ms. Caron clearly 
conveyed" their intent to exercise the option in fact do not support that averment. To the contrary, 
nowhere in the cited portions of Mr. Morton's affidavit is there described or otherwise adequately 
alleged a clear and unambiguous oral communication of Pomodoro's intent to renew, or a 
corresponding clear and unambiguous oral communication of Hillside's waiver of the requirement 
for a timely, written exercise of renewal. Instead, Mr. Morton's affidavit states Mr. Morton's 
subjective belief ("I believed") about Hillside's agent's subjective belief ("impression").1 This 
averment of a double-layered subjective belief does not rise to the level of "clearly conveyed" as 
alleged in f 4 of Pomodoro's Statement of Facts. Mr. Morton's affidavit does not support 
1
 The relevant portions of Brian Morton's affidavit cited as support read as follows: 
8. My partner, Wendy Caron and I had prior to the April 24, 1997 
meeting discussed our intent to renew the lease, and went to this meeting on April 
24, 1997 with the purpose of expressing that intent to [Hillside's] agent. 
9. It was obvious to me, and /believed obvious to [Hillside's] agent, that 
we were not going to make improvements on the leasehold premises and then leave 
at the end of the year. As such, at the conclusion of that meeting, / believed that 
[Hillside's] agent left with the impression that by making the improvements on the 
premises we intended to renew. 
(Emphasis added.) 
2 
Pomodoro's characterization of "clearly conveyed," and as such, the "clearly conveyed" language 
in If 4 of Pomodoro's Statement of Facts has no evidentiary basis and is a patent mischaracterization 
of the communications (or the lack thereof) between the parties on April 24, 1997. 
5. Hillside does not dispute the allegations of ^  5 of Pomodoro's Statement of Facts, but 
avers that all repairs and improvements alleged in f 5 were contractual duties of Pomodoro pursuant 
to K 11 of the underlying Lease Agreement.2 
2
 Paragraph 11 of the Lease Agreement, entitled "Repairs," places on Pomodoro, as 
tenant, a total obligation to maintain the entire leasehold premises at its own cost. Paragraph 11 
reads as follows: 
Tenant shall, at its sole cost, keep and maintain (including replacements if 
necessary) the Demised Premises (excluding exterior structural walls and roofs 
which Landlord agrees to repair, but including the interior surface of exterior walls 
and all windows, doors, and glass) including the store front (including store front 
metal work and signs) and the interior of the Premises, in clean, good, and sanitary 
order, condition and repair, and promptly replace any glass which may be damaged 
or broken with glass of the same quality, hereby waiving all right to make repairs or 
replacements at the expense of Landlord. Tenant shall keep its sewers and drains 
open and clear and shall keep the sidewalk adjacent to the Demised Premises clean. 
Tenant agrees that not less often than every fourth year it will paint, varnish, 
wallpaper, or otherwise redecorate or renovate the interior of the Demised 
Premises, including Tenant trade fixtures. By entry hereunder, Tenant accepts the 
Premises as being in good and sanitary order, condition and repair and agrees on the 
last day of said term, or sooner termination of this lease, to surrender unto Landlord 
the Premises in the same condition as when received, reasonable [wear] and tear 
excepted, and to remove all of tenant's signs and trade fixtures from the Premises. 
During the term of this lease Tenant shall keep in force a preventative 
maintenance contract with a qualified mechanical contractor covering any heating 
3 
6. Hillside does not dispute the allegations of f 6 of Pomodoro's Statement of Facts. 
7. Hillside does not dispute the allegations of f 7 of Pomodoro's Statement of Facts 
insofar as they characterize the untimely nature of Pomodoro's exercise of notice as six days late. 
However, Hillside does dispute the allegations of ^ 7 of Pomodoro's Statement of Facts insofar as 
they allege: (1) that Pomodoro or its representatives ever clearly or expressly communicated to 
Hillside or its representatives Pomodoro's intention to renew the lease (for the reasons outlined in 
If 4 above); (2) that Hillside's knowledge of Pomodoro's capital improvements to the leasehold 
premises in any way constituted knowledge on Hillside's part of Pomodoro's uncommunicated and 
subjective intent to renew,3 or that such improvements would not have been made absent an intention 
or air conditioning equipment located on the Premises, and upon request, shall 
provide Landlord with copy of said Contract. 
(Emphasis added.) 
3
 Again, the cited portions of Brian Morton's affidavit do not support this contention. 
The relevant portions of Mr. Morton's affidavit read as follows: 
15. . . . Neither Johnson, nor any other agent of [Hillside] ever inquired of us as 
to why we would make such costly improvements unless we intended to renew the 
lease. 
17. The delay in six (6) days in giving written notice was based upon a belief on 
our part that Johnson already had notice that we were to remain, based upon . . . the 
improvements on the leasehold premises. 
19. Our delay of six (6) days was not willful; rather, it was based upon our belief 
that we had complied with the provisions of the lease by . . . making improvements. 
4 
to renew4; and (3) that Pomodoro or its representatives ever gave verbal notice of intent to renew, 
or that Pomodoro's or its representatives' "reasonable belief as to the effectiveness of their 
alternative and unauthorized exercise of renewal in any way overcame the clear and unambiguous 
contractual requirement of a timely, written notice.5 
Again, Mr. Morton makes no averment of direct and unambiguous communication by either party 
to the other that improvements served as a notice of intent to renew. And again, Pomodoro is relying 
on Mr. Morton's double-layered subjectivity to impermissibly support a communication of notice: 
Mr. Morton believed that Hillside apprehended Mr. Morton's unspoken intent to renew based on 
improvements for which Pomodoro was already contractually obligated. Mr. Morton's affidavit fails 
to allege any communication apprising Hillside that such improvements would not have been made 
absent an intent to renew. Therefore, Pomodoro's allegation to that effect in f 7 of its Statement of 
Facts has no evidentiary basis and is another plain mischaracterization of Brian Morton's affidavit. 
4
 Because the improvements listed in f^ 5 of Pomodoro's Statement of Facts were 
improvements for which Pomodoro was obligated under ]f 11 of the underlying Lease Agreement, 
it does not logically follow that Hillside's knowledge of such improvements necessarily entails a 
knowledge of Pomodoro's uncommunicated and subjective intent to renew. 
5
 Again, the cited portions of Brian Morton's affidavit do not support this contention. 
The relevant portions of Mr. Morton's affidavit read as follows: 
17. The delay in six (6) days in giving written notice was based upon a belief on 
our part that Johnson already had notice that we were to remain, based upon the April 
meeting . . . [ . ] 
19. Our delay of six (6) days was not willful; rather, it was based upon our belief 
that we had complied with the provisions of the lease by giving notice at the April 
meeting . . . [ . ] 
As pointed out in footnote 1 above, the portion of Mr. Morton's affidavit actually describing the 
April meeting never alleges a direct and unambiguous oral communication of intent to renew, but 
only alleges Mr. Morton's subjective impression of Hillside's representative's purported belief. 
5 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Pomodoro failed to raise any issues of material fact in its affidavit opposing summary 
judgment below. None of the putative "material facts" raised by Pomodoro in its Appellant Brief 
were present in or were supported by its opposing affidavit. As such, the trial court was correct in 
finding no issues of material fact. 
Neither the I.X.L. nor Geisdorf cases require a routine preliminary examination of the 
equities prior to strictly enforcing an option provision, as is incorrectly suggested by Pomodoro. 
Rather, a court will strictly construe an option provision as a matter of law unless an optionee can 
show specific facts. (1) that meet the specificity requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); and (2) that 
demonstrate "unconscionable or clearly inequitable" circumstances, i.e., that an optionee's failure 
to properly exercise an option renewal was due to circumstances beyond the optionee's own 
inadvertence or was the result of the optionor's affirmative acts preventing the optionee's exercise. 
The burden is on the optionee to meet this essentially two-part test; a trial court does not have a 
threshold "duty" to conduct an equitable examination as a matter of course. Where an optionee fails 
to show such facts with specificity, as was the case with Pomodoro, a trial court is correct in strictly 
construing an option's provisions as a matter of law. Any examination of the equities is 
Therefore, Pomodoro's allegation of "giving verbal notice of intent" at the April 1997 meeting in 
f 7 of its Statement of Facts has no evidentiary basis and is another plain mischaracterization. 
6 
discretionary and is dependent on the optionee first meeting a necessarily high burden of alleging 
specific facts meriting an equitable exception to strict construal. Indeed, Geisdorf indicates that 
where an optionee fails to meet this burden, a court must strictly construe an option's provisions as 
a matter of law. 
Pomodoro has failed to adequately allege waiver, since its opposing affidavit below neither 
alleges instances of Hillside's distinct intent to waive or, taking Hillside's alleged actions as a whole, 
an unambiguous intent to waive. Pomodoro has failed to adequately allege a course of dealing acting 
as a waiver, since acts done under a bilateral contract, requiring a lower standard of substantial 
compliance, cannot be used to justify non-compliance with the terms of an option, which requires 
a higher standard of strict compliance. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING NO GENUINE ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACT. 
The trial court below granted Hillside summary judgment on the basis that "[t]he Court finds 
no genuine issues of material fact." (Summary Judgment, ^ 1.) Pomodoro challenges this basis of 
the trial court's ruling by contending that there actually were genuine issues of material fact raised 
below, and that if the trial court had considered such material "facts" as were purportedly raised by 
Pomodoro below, the court "would have been forced to conclude that there are material factual 
questions to be resolved in this matter and that a trial is required" (Aplt. Brief at 7), and that 
summary judgment was therefore unmerited. 
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Pomodoro relies on Brian Morton's affidavit as sole support for its putative "material facts." 
Yet a careful examination of Mr. Morton's affidavit reveals that it neither rehearses nor otherwise 
supports any "material facts" cited in Pomodoro's Brief, nor can such facts be inferred, as a matter 
of logic, from that affidavit's statements. 
A. Capital Improvements Triggering Renewal. 
Pomodoro presents the following as a "material fact" allegedly produced in the trial court 
below: "According to Pomodoro's testimony, Pomodoro stated to Hillside's agent, Mr. Johnson, that 
Pomodoro would renew the Lease if Pomodoro proceeded with certain capital improvements." (Aplt. 
Brief at 6; emphasis added.) 
Mr. Morton's affidavit does not support this contention, since nowhere in that document does 
Mr. Morton affirmatively represent that such a statement was ever made. The closest the affidavit 
comes to describing such a "statement" (if anything, it describes the utter lack of such a statement), 
are the following paragraphs: 
8. My partner, Wendy Caron and I had prior to the April 24, 1997 meeting [with 
Hillside's agent, Mr. Johnson] discussed our intent to renew the lease, and went to 
this meeting on April 24, 1997 with the purpose of expressing that intent to 
[Hillside's] agent. 
9. It was obvious to me, and I believed it was obvious to [Hillside's] agent, that 
we were not going to make improvements on the leasehold premises and then leave 
at the end of the year. As such, at the conclusion of that meeting, I believed that 
[Hillside's] agent left with the impression that by making the improvements on the 
premises we intended to renew. 
8 
Nowhere in the above passage is there described or represented a "statement" that Pomodoro 
would renew the lease by making capital improvements. Nor is such an inference merited. As 
discussed above, at most, Mr. Morton's affidavit describes a compounded subjectivity: Mr. Morton's 
subjective understanding of Mr. Johnson's subjective understanding of Mr. Morton's unspoken 
intent. 
It is precisely to avoid the confusion and possibilities for misunderstanding inherent in such 
subjective second-guessing that Utah courts strictly construe written option provisions according to 
their objective written terms. Also, Pomodoro fails to explain-if improvements in and of themselves 
acted as an effective exercise of the option, and were understood by both parties to act as such—why 
Pomodoro even bothered to later serve a written notice of exercise after having made improvements. 
B. Hillside's Acquiescence in Capital Improvements as Acceptance of Renewal. 
Pomodoro presents the following as a "material fact" allegedly produced in the trial court 
below: "Further, Pomodoro submits that Mr. Johnson, as agent for Hillside, acknowledged 
Pomodoro's position; observed and monitored Pomodoro's construction and installation of the 
capital improvements; and accepted the capital improvements as a permanent part of the leased 
premises." (Aplt. Brief at 6.) 
Nowhere in Mr. Morton's affidavit is there a representation that Mr. Johnson made an 
unambiguous and objective communication "acknowledging" Pomodoro's position. At most, Mr. 
Morton states what he thought was Mr. Johnson's "impression." (Affidavit of Brian Morton, J^ 9.) 
9 
Mr. Morton's subjective belief as to Mr. Johnson's "impression" is not tantamount to Mr. Johnson's 
"acknowledgment" of Pomodoro's position. 
Neither is there any objective representation that Mr. Johnson "observed and monitored" 
Pomodoro's capital improvements. Again, Mr. Morton frames such a contention in terms of his 
subjective belief: 
We were led to believe that [Hillside's] agent, Johnson, personally observed these 
improvements to the premises. 
(Affidavit of Brian Morton, Tf 15; emphasis added.) Again, Mr. Morton falls short of making an 
unambiguous, objective statement, but instead couches his representation in terms of subjective and 
largely unverifiable "belief." Such subjective belief, without more, is insufficient to create a genuine 
issue of material fact. 
However, even assuming, solely for the sake of argument, that Mr. Johnson both knew of and 
accepted Pomodoro's capital improvements, it does not logically follow that such knowledge and 
acceptance served as either an acceptance of alternative exercise of the renewal option or a waiver 
of the operative mode of option exercise already in place. Among other things, each of the capital 
improvements identified in Mr. Morton's affidavit arguably come under Pomodoro's tenant 
obligations as outlined in part in Tf 11 of the Lease Agreement, requiring Pomodoro to make certain 
improvements and be responsible for certain repairs. In other words, Mr. Johnson could have known 
of and accepted Pomodoro's capital improvements not because he knew or expected such 
improvements to act as an alternate form of option exercise, but because such improvements were 
10 
in fact required of Pomodoro under the express terms of the Lease Agreement. Because Pomodoro 
has neither addressed nor discounted this possibility (which Hillside asserts was in fact the case), it 
cannot expect Hillside's knowledge of improvements, by itself, to logically lead to the conclusion 
of Hillside's putative knowledge of Pomodoro's alternative exercise of option. 
C. The Parties' "Understanding" of No Need for Written Exercise of Option. 
Pomodoro further asserts: "However, it is Pomodoro's position . . . that Pomodoro didn't 
overlook the requirement of a writing, but rather believed, consistent with the understanding between 
Pomodoro and Mr. Johnson [Hillside's agent], that a writing [of intent to exercise the option] was 
unnecessary under these circumstances." (Aplt. Brief at 7.) 
As discussed above, a "belief as to an "understanding" that has never been alleged to be 
clearly and unequivocally communicated does not rise to the level of material fact. This 
shortcoming was discussed in If 4 of Hillside's Statement of Facts above, and Hillside's discussion 
and analysis there of the term "clearly conveyed" is equally applicable to the term "understanding" 
as used by Pomodoro on page 7 of its Appellant Brief. In other words, an "understanding" is a 
mutual recognition reached after a clear and unequivocal oral or written communication from one 
party to another; it is not the compounded subjectivity suggested by Pomodoro, i.e., Pomodoro's 
subjective belief as to Hillside's subjective understanding as to Pomodoro's belief. As discussed 
above, the relevant portions of Mr. Morton's affidavit do not contain any allegations of clear and 
unequivocal communications of intent or waiver, but are couched in the soft terms of "belief and 
11 
"impression." 
None of the "facts" that Pomodoro lists in Section I of its Argument has been established as 
a material fact. Each such "fact" either mischaracterizes the actual assertions made in Mr. Morton's 
affidavit, or is unsupportable from the representations of Mr. Morton's affidavit as taken at face 
value. As such, Pomodoro fails to meet the clear requirement of Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). That rule 
requires that a party seeking to oppose a motion for summary judgment by means of affidavit "must 
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial" (emphasis added). As 
demonstrated above, Brian Morton's affidavit failed to set forth any specific facts creating genuine 
issues of material facts. And as also demonstrated above, Pomodoro's assertion of "material facts" 
are the product of innuendo, mischaracterization, or subjective supposition; they do not arise out of 
any specific facts set forth in the affidavit of Brian Morton. As such, the trial court was entirely 
correct in concluding that Pomodoro had failed to raise any genuine issues of material fact below. 
II. ANY EQUITABLE ANALYSIS BY A TRIAL COURT WHEN CONSTRUING AN 
OPTION PROVISION IS DISCRETIONARY, NOT MANDATORY. 
A. The I.X.L. case was correctly applied. 
Pomodoro attempts to distinguish the fact pattern in this case from the fact pattern in the 
then-controlling case of I.X.L. Furniture and Carpet Installation House v. Berets, 91 P. 279 (Utah 
1907),6 and misleadlingly labels such differences as "extremely significant." 
6
 Subsequent to the trial court's issuance of summary judgment, the Supreme Court 
issued its decision in Geisdorf v. Doughty, 345 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Utah 1998), which, as 
12 
1. Date of Option Exercise. 
The first "important factual distinction" Pomodoro suggests is that in I.X.L.. the "expiration 
date of the lease [was] the last date to renew," whereas in the present case, Pomodoro delivered its 
written notice of renewal "almost four (4) months before the primary term ended." 
If Pomodoro is suggesting that proximity of lease expiration date to the deadline for notice 
is somehow a distinction between the two cases, it has raised a false distinction. If it is suggesting 
that I.X.L. stands for the proposition that a lease's expiration date acts as the deadline for exercising 
an option, it has misread and misrepresented that case. While the I.X.L. court recognizes that a lease 
renewal option not specifying the date by which exercise must be made will be construed as 
requiring exercise on or before expiration, it also recognizes that parties to a lease can set a renewal 
deadline on a date other than the expiration date. 91 P. at 282 ("if the parties had named a given date 
on which the request must be made, that day would control"). I.X.L. is therefore supportive of the 
proposition that the parties to an option can set both the time and manner for exercise, and that such 
a time can be any other date prior to expiration that the parties may see fit to choose. Indeed, almost 
any commercial option contract will specify a renewal deadline that is prior to, rather than 
coextensive with, expiration. It is a basic premise of contract law that the parties to a contract can 
determine the material terms of their contract, especially where such terms have a time or value 
component. 
demonstrated below, reaffirms the principles outlined in I.X.L. 
13 
In the instant case, we have parties who, by contract, set the deadline for exercise at 120 days 
prior to the lease expiration date. In I.X.L.. the parties, by the language of their option agreement 
set the exercise deadline for the same day as expiration. Therefore, this case and I.X.L. are 
indistinguishable in this regard: parties to a lease, by contract, can set a deadline by which to exercise 
an option, and exercise of that option will be strictly construed to have occurred in the manner and 
time outlined by the parties' written agreement. 
2. Examination of the Equities. 
Second, Pomodoro cites the I.X.L. case as support for the proposition that a trial court has 
"a duty . . . to review all of the facts which support claims for equitable relief," and that an 
"examination of the equities" is required. Pomodoro's argument is unavailing on any one of three 
levels: (1) I.X.L. does not compel a mandatory equitable review, but rather permits discretionary 
review; (2) the facts of this case do not merit examination of the equities or equitable relief; and (3) 
Pomodoro did not allege "specific facts" meriting examination of the equities or equitable relief. 
a. Discretionary Equitable Review. 
The I.X.L. court makes it clear that a trial court has 
no right to disregard any provisions of a contract, or to save rights that are lost 
thereunder through the act of a party asking relief, unless it is made to appear that it 
would be unconscionable or clearly inequitable to do or not to do so. 
91 P. at 283 (emphasis added). In other words, a trial court must strictly construe the express terms 
of an option contract unless an optionee can demonstrate "unconscionable or clearly inequitable" 
14 
facts. By virtue of Utah R. Civ. 56(e), any such allegations must be based on "specific facts." The 
"unconscionable or clearly inequitable" standard is a necessarily high one. Because an option's 
provisions are subject to a standard of strict construal, it follows that any challenge to those 
provisions on equitable grounds must necessarily meet a correspondingly strict burden of proof. The 
I.X.L. court validates this proposition by explaining that the "unconscionable or clearly inequitable" 
standard may be met in only clearly extraordinary circumstances, such as where the optionor 
conceals the terms of exercise from the optionee, or where the optionor otherwise affirmatively 
prevents the optionee from exercising its option. In other words, consideration of equitable factors 
is a necessarily high standard that applies only in circumstances where the optionor has somehow 
affirmatively prevented the optionee's exercise. It does not apply to any and all instances of 
unfairness or harm. In particular, it does not apply to circumstances where the optionee's own 
carelessness or inadvertence is the cause of its failure to exercise. 
b. No Facts Alleged Requiring Equitable Review. 
Moreover, the I.X.L. court found that the "unconscionable or clearly inequitable" standard 
did not apply to that case even assuming the truth of the plaintiffs allegations. In other words, the 
trial court in I.X.L. correctly exercised its discretion not to engage in an examination of the equities. 
Similar to Pomodoro, the I.X.L. plaintiff argued, among other things, that it had made costly 
15 
improvements to the leasehold premises at issue,7 and that it had made the landlord aware of its 
intention to exercise its option through daily conversations over a month-long period.8 The I.X.L. 
court held that even granting the truthfulness of the plaintiffs allegations, the plaintiff had still failed 
to allege the type of inequity that would circumvent strict construal of the option's unambiguous 
provisions. The I.X.L. plaintiffs failure to timely exercise was not due to any fraud, concealment, 
or other affirmatively inequitable behavior on the part of the landlord. To the contrary, exercise of 
the lease provision, in the time and manner specified by the written agreement, entailed requirements 
of which the tenant either already knew or had the ready means of ascertaining. Therefore, any 
failure to exercise was due to the tenant's own inadvertence, and as such, it would not be 
7
 In I.X.L.. the tenant had made improvements worth $750, or 7.5 times its monthly 
rent of $100. Here, Pomodoro claims to have made improvements worth approximately $50,000, 
or 9.6 times the fair rental value of the leasehold premises ($5,200), a ratio roughly comparable to 
that of the I.X.L. tenant. Furthermore, if we only factor in those improvements specifically alleged 
in the affidavit of Brian Morton (Tffl 10-13), totaling approximately $26,500, then Pomodoro's 
specifically alleged improvements are only 5 times the fair rental value of the premises, well below 
that of the I.X.L. tenant. 
8
 The I.X.L. tenant alleged that its officers 
met and talked with one of the respondents almost daily, and frequently did so with 
another of the respondents, and that both said respondents knew and were fully aware 
during all of said time, and long before the expiration of said lease, that appellant had 
elected and intended to continue said lease and in the occupation of said premisesf.]" 
91 P. at 279. 
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"unconscionable or clearly inequitable" for the court to enforce the option according to its clear and 
written terms. 
That same analysis is supportive of the trial court's decision below. Pomodoro has not 
alleged any conduct on the part of Hillside that in any way prevented Pomodoro from exercising 
written notice in a timely manner. Such requirements were either known to or ascertainable by 
Pomodoro,9 and its failure to either ascertain or follow them does not entitle it to equitable relief 
negating the clear terms of the written option agreement. 
c. Failure to Allege Specific Facts. 
Even conceding, solely for the sake of argument, that the trial court had some duty to 
examine the equities prior to construing the option provisions, Pomodoro has failed to allege any 
specific facts meriting an equitable review (as has been demonstrated in Section I above). Pomodoro 
has failed to adequately allege specific communications between the parties conveying an intent to 
exercise alternative means of exercise or an intent to waive contractually-required means of exercise. 
Pomodoro has not alleged as specific facts any actions on the part of Hillside that effectively denied 
9
 Pomodoro's principals were aware of the option provisions, or, if not aware, had the 
documents in hand to ascertain them. The affidavit of Brian Morton alleges: 
I indicated to [Hillside's agent] that we did not wish to renegotiate the lease since we 
already had a lease which had two (2) renewal options available to us. At that point, 
my partner, Wendy Caron, retrieved the lease for Johnson and pointed out to him that 
there were two (2) five (5) year renewal terms available under the present lease. 
(Affidavit of Brian Morton, ^ 6.) 
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Pomodoro a chance to exercise its option in a proper fashion. Pomodoro has not alleged any specific 
facts showing that it did not know or could not ascertain the requirements of exercise, or that even 
if it did not, why such ignorance or inability represents anything other than self-defeating 
inadvertence. 
d. I.X.L. Standard of Discretionary Review. 
I.X.L. did not require a trial court, as an affirmative duty, to engage in an examination of 
equities prior to construing an option's provisions. Rather, it indicated such an examination is at 
best discretionary, and is triggered only in instances where an optionee is somehow prevented from 
exercising the option due to the clearly inequitable conduct of the optionor (but not in instances 
where the ability to exercise is clearly within the optionee's power but it nevertheless fails to do so). 
This suggests that unless Pomodoro could adduce a certain quality of facts supporting its 
equitable argument, the trial court was in fact required to strictly construe the provisions of the 
option agreement as a matter of law. Pomodoro attempts to impermissibly shift its own burden onto 
the trial court by suggesting that an examination of the equities is somehow a mandatory or 
preliminary inquiry. It is in fact Pomodoro who bore the burden of demonstrating equitable 
circumstances; the trial court had no preexisting duty to examine equities as a matter of course. 
This further suggests that in the present instance, Pomodoro had a two-fold burden of proof 
before the trial court could have conducted any examination of equities. First, Pomodoro had to 
allege "unconscionable and clearly inequitable" facts with specificity as required by Utah R. Civ. 
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P. 56(e). It could not throw out unsupported opinion, innuendo, or subjective impressions and 
expect the same to trigger an examination of the equities precluding strict construal of a clear and 
unambiguous option provision. As detailed in Section I above, Pomodoro clearly has failed to do 
that. Second, Pomodoro had to meet the necessarily high standard of demonstrating 
"unconscionable and clearly inequitable" facts, i.e., affirmative actions on the part of Hillside to 
prevent Pomodoro's exercise of its option. It has failed to offer any such facts. The worst Hillside 
could be accused of, based on the affidavit of Brian Morton, is silence, which acts neither as an 
effective waiver nor as the type of behavior preventing Pomodoro's exercise of its renewal option. 
It follows that where the means of exercise were both known to Pomodoro and solely within 
Pomodoro's control, Hillside cannot be said to have prevented exercise. It also follows that where 
Pomodoro has failed to meet its burden of proof as to either specificity or quality of facts, it has no 
"entitlement" to equitable review. 
Therefore, absent any demonstration of "unconscionable and clearly inequitable" conduct 
on the part of an optionor, construal and enforcement of an option provision is a legal and not 
equitable matter. Pomodoro failed to allege any "unconscionable and clearly inequitable" conduct 
on the part of Hillside. Therefore, the trial court's conclusion that the option scenario before it was 
"a legal issue and not an equitable one" was entirely correct as well as consonant with the reasoning 
of the I.X.L. court. 
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e. Geisdorf Reaffirms I.X.L.-Type Discretionary Review. 
Pomodoro is in part correct when it asserts that the recent case of Geisdorf v. Doughty. 345 
Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Utah 1998) ratifies the requirements set forth in I.X.L.. but is incorrect, as 
demonstrated above, in asserting that I.X.L. (or Geisdorf) requires any mandatory, threshold 
examination of the equities prior to construing an option's provisions. In fact, Geisdorf reaffirms 
the discretionary nature of such review as laid down in I.X.L.. First, it notes, at some length, that 
"performance of an option requires strict compliance" and that exercise must be "unconditionally 
and precisely according to the terms of the option." 345 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18 (citations omitted). 
Second, it recognizes that equitable considerations may justify deviation from the rule of strict 
construal, but only in very limited circumstances. Like I.X.L.. Geisdorf identifies such instances as 
being extraordinary, such as "exigent circumstances beyond [the parties'] control," "honest and 
justifiable mistake," and "where the strict compliance was prevented by some act of the optionor." 
Id. at 18-19. And like I.X.L.. it expressly excludes as an equitable exception to the rule of strict 
construal those instances where a failure to exercise is due to "willful or gross negligence on the part 
of the optionee[.]" Id at 19. 
Geisdorf says nothing that would support the notion that an examination of equities is a 
mandatory, preliminary inquiry that a court must carry out as a matter of course. Rather, like I.X.L.. 
it indicates that a court has a duty to strictly construe option provisions, and that any examination 
of equities will take place only where an optionee alleges specific facts meeting the necessarily high 
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standard of extraordinarily inequitable results. IdL ("In the absence of some supervening, excusing 
instance, this court has no choice but to require strict compliance with the terms of the Lease 
Agreement"; emphasis added.) Where allegations of an "excusing instance" either fail to meet the 
specificity requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e), or to allege the extraordinary circumstances 
contemplated by I.X.L. and Geisdorf. then a court must strictly construe an option's provisions as 
a matter of law. Therefore, given the fact that the affidavit of Brian Morton failed to allege specific 
facts or extraordinary circumstances that would merit an examination of equities, the trial court 
below was entirely correct to strictly construe the option's notice provision as a matter of law. 
Finally, Pomodoro gives the misleading impression that a trial court's consideration of 
"instances in which deviation from strict compliance may be equitably excused," Id at 19, is 
governed by a "totality of the circumstances inquiry." Id at 20. In fact, the Geisdorf court does not 
equate the two, and does not mandate a "totality of the circumstances" inquiry for the broad issue 
of equitable exceptions to strict construal. It speaks of a "totality of the circumstances" inquiry only 
in regard to the narrow issue of waiver implied from conduct. It does not speak of a "totality of the 
circumstances" inquiry as in any way preliminary or mandatory to a court's construal of option 
provisions. 
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f. Pomodoro Cannot Avail Itself of the "Honest Mistake" Equitable 
Exception to Strict Construal, Since Both Its Waiver and Course of 
Dealing Arguments Necessarily Fail. 
Pomodoro tries to avail itself of the "honest and justifiable mistake" equitable exception 
identified in Geisdorf. This exception is unavailable to Pomodoro for several reasons. First, there 
is no question that the knowledge, means, and ability to exercise timely written notice were available 
to Pomodoro at all times. A party to an arms-length contract is assumed to know the contents of that 
contract, and is thereby "obliged to take reasonable steps to inform himself, and to protect his own 
interests." Geisdorf. 345 Utah Adv. at 20 (citations and emphasis omitted). Where a party is a 
signatory to a contract, and has his own copy of the same to which he can refer, requirements for 
time and manner of notice of exercise are "reasonably within the knowledge of both parties." Id 
"[E]ach party has the burden to read and understand the terms of a contract before he or she affixes 
his or her signature to it." Id This duty is ongoing: each such party has a responsibility "to keep 
himself informed about the continuing provisions under the Lease Agreement and to protect his 
interests, both current and future, in the leased property." Id Here, Pomodoro had the duty to 
know and be familiar with the contents of the option agreement. The evidence suggests that its 
principals did. See Affidavit of Brian Morton, 16. Pomodoro has not provided any compelling facts 
that would relieve it of its clear duty to inform itself and protect its interests. 
Second, Pomodoro has not adequately alleged implied waiver in a manner that would relieve 
Pomodoro of its duty to inform itself and protect its interests. The affidavit of Brian Morton never 
22 
alleges a clear, unequivocal waiver by Hillside or its representatives of the requirement for timely, 
written notice. This is not an instance where waiver can be implied from silence, see Geisdorf. 345 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 20, so Pomodoro necessarily is left with arguing that Hillside's waiver is implied 
from its conduct. Because option contracts are subject to the strict construal standard of 
interpretation and enforcement, waiver of such provisions is subject to a correspondingly strict 
standard of proof. kL at 19 ("Since the performance of options requires a stricter standard than 
performance of bilateral contracts, it logically follows that a stricter standard is necessary for the 
waiver of option contracts than that which is required for waiver of bilateral contract provisions.") 
The plaintiff in Geisdorf attempted the same argument, on nearly identical facts. Like 
Pomodoro, the Geisdorf plaintiff argued that waiver could be implied from the "premise that [the 
landlord] knew or believed that [the tenant] would exercise his option to renew." He also argued that 
a verbal intent to renew was given prior to his untimely written notice. Similar to Pomodoro, the 
Geisdorf plaintiff relied on allegations of meetings between the parties "from which no distinct intent 
to waive the written notice requirement could reasonably be drawn." The Geisdorf court found that 
none of the instances alleged by the plaintiff rose to the level of "distinct intent," and that the several 
instances of arguably "indistinct intent" taken as a whole could not "reasonably evince unambiguous 
intent." Id Of particular note, the Geisdorf court found that the plaintiffs representations as to the 
parties' beliefs were not compelling evidence of waiver: 
[The tenant's] belief of what [the landlord] knew or should have known does not 
distinctly indicate whether she intended to waive notice. Similarly, [the landlord's] 
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assumed knowledge of [the tenant's] intent to exercise the option does not work a 
waiver of the requirement. . . Furthermore, neither the discussion about the future 
payment schedule nor the consultation about painting the building provides distinct 
inferences to support an intent to waive written notice; myriad possible conclusions 
can be drawn from either instance. 
Id. at 20-21 (emphasis added). The same analysis is equally applicable to the affidavit of Brian 
Morton. Nowhere does it identify an instance of distinct intent on the part of Pomodoro to waive. 
Mr. Morton's belief about what Hillside or it representatives knew or should have known does not 
evidence a distinct intent to waive. Discussions about improvements cannot act as distinct 
inferences of intent to waive, since other possibilities exist, e.g., Hillside understood such 
improvements to be part of Pomodoro's contractual duties as tenant. And the suggested instances 
of indistinct intent, as alleged by way of subjective impressions and suppositions, taken as a whole, 
do not manifest an unambiguous intent to waive on the part of Hillside. 
The fact that waiver issues are "highly fact-dependent" does not work in Pomodoro's favor. 
Pomodoro cannot avail itself of a "highly fact-dependent" issue by merely in canting the term 
"waiver" while at the same time failing to meet the specificity requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
Pomodoro cannot invoke the "highly fact-dependent" nature of waiver where it has failed to adduce 
or allege any material facts that would create issues of material fact as to waiver. Pomodoro cannot 
assert waiver-related "facts" in its memoranda where those "facts" find no support or unambiguous 
expression in the affidavit of Brian Morton. Quite simply, Pomodoro failed in its burden to allege 
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specific material facts below, and cannot now complain that the trial court decided the matter as an 
issue of law when Pomodoro's own deficiencies left the trial court no other choice. 
Third, although this point was discussed in some detail above, it bears reiteration since 
Pomodoro continues to misrepresent unsupported allegations as "material facts" asserted below: 
Nowhere in Mr. Morton's affidavit is there support for the allegation that Pomodoro "advised" or 
made a "statement" to Hillside that Pomodoro's improvements would act as alternative exercise of 
its option. Even if it had, it has failed to adequately allege any waiver, either by word or act, on the 
part of Hillside. As such, Pomodoro could not base a "belief that written notice was no longer 
necessary on a statement that was never made. And it follows that Pomodoro's questionable "belief 
in a non-statement cannot qualify it for the "honest and justifiable mistake" exception to strict 
construal. Mr. Morton's affidavit does not allege any express, unequivocal facts that would justify 
Pomodoro's "belief that it did not have to strictly comply with the option's exercise requirements. 
As such, this Court should discount all misrepresentations in Section II.D. of Pomodoro's Appellant 
Brief that are at variance with or find no support in the plain language of Brian Morton's affidavit. 
The points discussed above likewise serve to invalidate Pomodoro's argument that the 
parties' "course of dealing" gave Pomodoro a "reasonable expectation that the written notice 
requirement of the renewal provisions of the Lease would not be enforced."10 Pomodoro alleges that 
10
 The relevant portion of Brian Morton's affidavit that addresses this issue reads as 
follows: 
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Hillside had not required strict performance "with other provisions of the lease."1 ] However, there 
is a qualitative difference between bilateral contracts and option provisions. A bilateral contract may 
require at best substantial compliance, while an option provision, which is essentially an offer that 
must be accepted according to its exact terms, is subject to a strict compliance standard rather than 
a substantial compliance standard. Geisdorf 345 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18. By comparing lease 
provisions with option provisions, Pomodoro is comparing apples with oranges. The underlying 
bilateral lease agreement is subject to a lower standard of compliance than is the option provision. 
It follows that a course of dealing in regard to the document subject to the lower standard of 
compliance cannot act to waive the requirements of a document with a higher standard of 
compliance. The assertion that Hillside waived strict compliance with other lease provisions (though 
Pomodoro has failed to state with any specificity the affected provisions, or the time and manner of 
waiver) is meaningless, since Hillside was under no duty of strict compliance with regard to lease 
provisions (but was rather under a substantial compliance standard). 
Over the prior three (3) years of the lease, we received notice from the landlord prior 
to September as to what the escalation in the rent would be, and we waited until that 
notice before we began paying new rent. We believed that the landlord would send 
us a similar notice with respect to the renewal, and simply forgot about the written 
requirement until we received Johnson's letter of September 3, 1997. 
11
 Pomodoro has not alleged any specific instances of Hillside's not requiring "strict 
compliance with other provisions of the Lease." No such instances are ascertainable from the 
affidavit of Brian Morton. Hillside's courtesy in providing advance notice of rent escalation, as 
mentioned in U 18 of Brian Morton's affidavit, does not equate to a waiver of Pomodoro's 
compliance with lease provisions. 
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B. Pomodoro's Alleged "Undue Hardship" Does Not Merit Equitable Relief. 
Pomodoro alleges several types of harm stemming from its inability to renew the lease, such 
as loss of expenditures made toward capital improvements (which, as discussed elsewhere, were 
tenant obligations under the lease in any event) and loss of commercial good will associated with 
the leasehold location, as meriting equitable relief. The same types of harm were raised by the I.X.L. 
plaintiff, and were rejected by the I.X.L. court as insufficient bases for equitable relief. As was the 
case in I.X.L.. any harm accruing to Pomodoro was of its own making. Pomodoro had within its 
power, throughout the time period in question, knowledge of and ability to exercise the option in the 
contractually-specified manner. There is no allegation that Hillside either concealed such terms from 
Pomodoro or otherwise affirmatively prevented Pomodoro from exercising timely, written exercise. 
Furthermore, Pomodoro can claim no forfeiture or loss of right. It did not lose any 
contractual rights by its failure to timely exercise. It was not deprived of anything it already had. 
At most, it "lost nothing but an opportunity by not performing a condition required of it[.]" I.X.L.. 
91 P. at 283 (emphasis added). Lost opportunities, particularly where they are the result of an 
optionee's own inadvertence, and no matter how regrettable, are not actionable, let alone the subject 
for equitable relief that would circumvent the clear and ambiguous terms of an option provision. 
CONCLUSION 
For the all of the foregoing reasons, Pomodoro's appeal should be dismissed. 
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ADDENDUM 
No addendum is necessary under Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(l 1). 
Respectfully submitted. 
DATED this Q ^ day of February, 1999. 
KESLER & RUST 
Scott O. Mercer 
Matthew G. Bagley 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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